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THE SECURITY COUNCIL BLOCKADE OF IRAQ:
CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER AND THE FOURTH GENEVA
CONVENTION
Michael R. Sklaire*
INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait without provocation
and without warning.1 The United Nations Security Council led world
condemnation of Iraq's actions through a series of resolutions that
sought to isolate Iraq politically and economically. 2 The Security Council's actions showed not only renewed world support for the role of the
United Nations in resolving international disputes, but also unprecedented unity among its members. 3 For the first time in its forty-five
year history, the Security Council voted to enforce an economic embargo through the use of military force by its member-nations. 4
The economic blockade against Iraq raised questions about the Security Council's obligations to civilians under the laws of armed conflict
including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 5 The Fourth Geneva Conven* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al.
2. S.C. Res. 660, S.C. Res. 661, S.C. Res. 662, S.C. Res. 664, S.C. Res. 665, S.C.
Res. 666, S.C. Res. 667, S.C. Res. 670, S.C. Res. 674, S.C. Res. 677, S.C. Res. 678
(1990). Member nations of the current Security Council include: China, France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, all having veto power, and Ca-

nada, Columbia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen,
and Zaire. 1990 Y.B. Irr'L

ORG.

1212 (27th ed.).

3. See Lewis, Security Counsel Votes 13 & 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al (noting that the Security Council's successful unity resulted from improved relations between the United States and Soviet Union, and increased confidence in the United Nations to resolve international disputes); see also
infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text (discussing previous unified Security Council
resolutions that are similar in substance to the Iraqi resolutions).
4. Goshko, U.N. Approves Use of Forcefor Iraqi Embargo, Wash. Post, Aug. 26,
1990, at Al.
5. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. 1), Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]: Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]:
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No.
III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
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tion prohibits at all times, without political scrutiny, the blockade of
food, medical supplies, and other essentials during an armed conflict to
protect civilians from the effects of military action.' In establishing the
blockade, however, the Security Council passed various resolutions that

enabled it to determine when and how humanitarian aid would be distributed, without requiring adherence to the Conventions.

Viewing the Council's actions in terms of the United Nations Charter alone, adherence may not have been necessary.' Article 103 of the

United Nations Charter provides that actions by the Security Council
shall prevail over all other international obligations,8 including the Geneva Conventions. Viewing the Council's actions in terms of humanitarian principles of armed conflict, the member states' obligations under
the Geneva Conventions and the Security Council's authority under article 103 directly conflict.
This Comment asserts that article 103 of the United Nations Charter does not give the Security Council the power to supersede the

Fourth Geneva Convention. This conclusion is based first, upon the relative generality and ambiguity of article 103, and the changing, unpredictable, political nature of the Security Council. Second, the Geneva

Conventions create binding customary international law that the
United Nations Charter may not supersede, as interpreted and supported by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States.' Part I reviews the pre-war resolutions adopted by the Security
Council to impose the economic embargo against Iraq; comparing the
blockade resolutions to past Security Council actions concerning the
use of force and the implementation of economic sanctions. This comparison will reveal the uniqueness of the Security Council's actions pertaining to the blockade of Iraq. Part II describes the Geneva ConvenThird Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time
of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
6. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 23.
7. See S.C. Res. 666 (1990) (determining that a Sanctions Committee of the Security Council shall monitor the humanitarian conditions in Iraq and Kuwait to determine when supplies of food and medicine will be sent); S.C. Res. 669 (1990) (reaffirming the responsibility of the Committee to make recommendations to the Council on
conditions in Iraq and Kuwait).
8. U.N. Charter, art. 103 [hereinafter U.N. Charter or Charter]. Article 103
provides:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Id1.

9. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27).
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tions, and analyzes the Fourth Geneva Convention's application to the
Iraqi embargo. Part II demonstrates how these Conventions have be-

come binding customary international law through their universal acceptance. Finally, Part III analyzes article 103 of the United Nations
Charter. A review of the International Court of Justice's decision in

Nicaragua v. United States illustrates why the Security Council may
not supersede customary international law, specifically, the provisions

of the Geneva Conventions protecting civilians during armed conflict.
I.
A.

THE IRAQI BLOCKADE
THE BLOCKADE RESOLUTIONS

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, the international community responded immediately.10 The United States led its western allies, the
Soviet Union, and even Iraq's Arab neighbors in the deployment of
troops to Saudi Arabia and in an embargo of Iraqi oil." On August 6,
1990, the United Nations Security Council responded to these actions
by adopting the first of twelve resolutions, which condemned Iraq's invasion, and creating an economic embargo of all cargo headed to and
from Iraq by land, sea, and air on August 6, 1990.12
Adopted unanimously, resolution 66113 defined the scope of the embargo to include all commodities and products, with the exception of
medical supplies and foodstuffs for humanitarian purposes.1 4 The
Council did not elaborate on how and when to distribute humanitarian
10. See Baghdad's Bully, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1990, at 18 (describing how President George Bush contacted various world leaders the night of the invasion to discuss
the military and economic responses to Iraq's invasion).
11. Id.
12. S.C. Res. 661 (1990). This Comment will deal only with the blockade of Iraq,
and not Kuwait, because the laws concerning the blockade of an occupied territory
involve separate issues under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law.
See The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts. 27-34 (detailing the Convention's application to occupied territories).
13. S.C. Res. 661 (1990).
14. Id. at 3(c). This provision states that the Security Council:
Decides that all states shall prevent ... [t]he sale or supply by their nationals or
from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products.
including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in
their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes,
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs to any person or body in Iraq or
Kuwait ....
Id. Thirteen members voted for the resolution, none voted against it. and Cuba and
Yemen abstained. Id.; see Lewis, supra note 3, at Al (describing the Security Council
vote and reactions to the resolution).

612
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relief to Iraq. 15 Six weeks later, however, the Security Council established a committee to monitor
the shipment of food and medical sup6
plies to Iraqi civillians.1
On August 25, 1990, the Security Council voted to enforce the sea
embargo through the use of the international military forces in the Persian Gulf under United States command.' 7 Three weeks later, the
Council expanded the embargo to include air shipments arriving in and
leaving from Iraq and Kuwait. 18 These resolutions called upon the military forces to prevent the movement of supplies without explicitly authorizing the use of force. 19 Official statements in the United States
and Iraq, however, indicated that the Security Council had referred to
the blockade broadly enough so as to allow for the use of armed force
against those who tried to violate the embargo. 20 For the first time in
15. See Hughes, Crisis in the Gulf. US Insists Iraq, The Independent, Aug. 14,
1990, at 9 (quoting Marlin Fitzwater, President Bush's press secretary, who stated that
the President did not view the resolution as requiring the passage of food and medicine,
because Iraq had adequate supplies of both).
16. S.C. Res. 666 (1990). The pertinent preambulatory clauses read:
Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied ... in order to relieve human suffering; Emphasizing that it
is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the Committee [established
by this resolution], to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have
arisen. . . Decides that if the Committee . . . determines that circumstances
have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to
Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the
Council its decision as to how such needs should be met.
Id. See Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf" Anxiety over the Effect of Sanctions on Civilians,
The Independent, Sept. 1, 1990, at 9 (describing United States officials' concern about
how to define humanitarian circumstances). The United States government sought to
consider humanitarian circumstances in very limited situations; refusing the delivery of
foodstuffs for at least three months because Iraq expected a bumper harvest. Id.
17. S.C. Res. 665 (1990). The Security Council adopted the resolution with no
opposing votes, while Cuba and Yemen abstained, Id.; see also Barber, Crisis in the
Gulf: United Nations: Is It Free at Last or Queen for a Day?, The Independent, Aug.
26, 1990, at 13 (highlighting the unanimity of the Security Council and the purposely
broad language of the resolution).
18. S.C. Res. 670 (1990). The resolution provided that no aircraft could enter or
leave Iraq and Kuwait without inspection by the military forces patrolling in the Persian Gulf. Id. The resolution passed fourteen to one. Cuba was the only country that
voted against it. See Lewis, Security Counsel Adds Air Embargo to Iraq Sanctions,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at Al (detailing the vote).
19. See Barber, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that resolution 665 did not explicitly
authorize the use of force as the result of compromises among the Council members,
but that all members considered the language to allow such force, if necessary). Resolution 665 used the phrase "such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances
as may be necessary under the authority of Security Council" to allow for the use of
force. S.C. Res. 665 (1990). Resolution 670 provided that states use "all necessary
measures" to stop aircraft. S.C. Res. 670 (1990).
20. See Pace, Confrontation in the Gulf, UN Calls on Navies to Block Iraqs
Trade, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at Al (quoting Thomas Pickering, the United
States ambassador to the United Nations, and explaining that the Security Council
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its history, the Security Council authorized the use of military action to
enforce mandatory sanctions against a member state of the United
2 1

Nations.

B.

PRIOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS

The Security Council had approved the use of force only twice previously, but never to enforce economic sanctions. 2 One such use of force
occurred in 1950, when the United States ordered a military response
to an attack by North Korean forces on South Korea. 23 The Security
Council responded by calling upon member nations, pursuant to article
51 of the United Nations Charter, 24 to offer assistance to South Kodrafted the resolution in broad terms to include the use of force in certain, undefined
circumstances). Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor to President George
Bush, interpreted the resolution as allowing United States warships to fire upon and
disable ships that tried to break through the embargo. Goshko, supra note 4, at Al. At
the same time, Iraqi diplomats warned that the resolution's statement of force would
escalate hostilities and make the United States appear as the aggressor. Id.
21. See Pace, supra note 20, at Al (noting that the Security Council approved the
use of force only twice before, during the Korean War and during the Southern Rhodesian rebellion); see also Goshko, supra note 4, at Al (describing resolution 665); Watson, War Path, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1990, at 19 (discussing the deployment of troops
and the effects of the blockade on Iraq). Other resolutions that the Security Council
adopted in condemning the Iraqi invasion included resolution 662, adopted August 9,
calling on member nations not to recognize the annexation of Kuwait by the Iraqi
government. S.C. Res. 662 (1990). Resolution 664, adopted on August 18, requested
that Iraq release all foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait. S.C. Res. 664 (1990). On September 17, the Security Council condemned the abduction of diplomatic personnel
from foreign embassies in Kuwait. S.C. Res. 667 (1990). On September 24, the Council reaffirmed the authority of the Sanctions Committee established in resolution 666.
S.C. Res. 669 (1990). On October 29, the Security Council asked countries to document human rights violations and economic damage that had resulted from the invasion of Kuwait, and held Iraq liable for restitution and financial damages. S.C. Res.
674 (1990). Resolution 677, passed November 28, condemned Iraq's destruction of
Kuwaiti records and the movement of Kuwaiti citizens. S.C. Res. 677 (1990). Finally,
on November 29, 1990, the Security Council authorized the use of force by membernations to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait if they did not withdraw by January 15,
1991. S.C. Res. 678 (1990). See Hoffman, Bush Policy Requires Global Tradeoffs,
Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1990, at Al. A23 (describing the unprecedented Security Council
vote and summarizing prior resolutions).
22. See Pace, supra note 20, at Al (comparing the Persian Gulf War to the Korean conflict and to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia).
23. See Review of the United Nations Charter. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the United Nations Charterof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
837-39 (1954) (describing the United States view of United Nations actions in Korea);
see also infra note 26 (noting the differences between the Security Council actions in
the Korean conflict and the Iraqi blockade).
24. U.N. Charter, art. 51. The article describes the right of collective self defense
against breaches of international security and peace. Id.
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rea. 5 The Council also recommended that all member nations provide
military supplies and personnel for an international security force
under the command of the United Nations.26
In 1965, the Security Council voted to take military action against
the Southern Rhodesian independence movement. Security Council
resolution 202 did not explicitly authorize the use of force. 8 The General Assembly, however, interpreted resolution 202 as explicitly re-

questing the United Kingdom to end the rebellion through the use of
force if necessary. 21 The General Assembly resolution further required
the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, regarding threats to international peace and security, to guarantee enforcement of the resolution.3 °

Subsequent resolutions concerning the Southern Rhodesian rebellion
favored sanctions over force to resolve conflicts.

31

Acting again under

Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council, in 1966, imposed
25.

S.C. Res. 82, 5 U.N. SCOR (473d mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (1950) re-

printed in K. Wellens,
CURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS

(1946-1989)-A

THEMATIC GUIDE

OF THE UNITED NATIONS SE-

252 (1990); see H.

KELSEN, THE

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
927 (1951) (citing the Korean resolution as the first substantive test of Security Council influence).
26. S.C. Res. 84, 5 U.N. SCOR (474th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950).
Because the Soviet Union, a veto power member, was absent from the Council proceedings, the successful passage of resolution 84 was possible. See K. Wellens, supra note
25, at 254 (describing the circumstances surrounding the vote on the Korean situation).
The action in Korea differed from the Iraqi situation in that the Security Council authorized the use of force under the United Nations command in Korea, while in the
Iraqi blockade, the Security Council authorized the use of force both individually and
collectively, but not under a United Nations flag. H. KELSEN, supra note 25, at 935.
27. S.C. Res. 202, 20 U.N. SCOR (1202d mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.l
(1965). In August 1964, the white minority regime of Ian Smith indicated that it could
unilaterally declare its independence from the United Kingdom. R. Zacklin, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND RHODESIA: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1974) (documenting the history of the Rhodesian independence movement and the subsequent
United Nations actions).
28. See S.C. Res. 202, 20 U.N. SCOR (1202d mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/
Rev.1 (1965) (requesting that the United Kingdom take all necessary action to prevent
the Southern Rhodesian leaders from declaring independence).
29. G.A. Res. 2022, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp., U.N. Doc. A/6041/Add.1 (1965).
30. Id. The Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, allowing the Security Council to determine the measures necessary for controlling
acts of aggression and maintaining world peace. U.N. Charter, art. 39. See generally
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

R.

HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167-231 (1963) (detailing the United Nations prac-

tices implicating the use of force).
31. See S.C. Res. 217, 20 U.N. SCOR (1265th mtg.) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
20/Rev.1 (1965) (requesting that all member-nations terminate economic relations
with Southern Rhodesia, specifically the sale of military equipment to, and the
purchase of oil from Southern Rhodesia).
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mandatory economic sanctions against a nation for the first time22
While the sanctions prohibited the export of Rhodesian resources, such

as iron and chrome, and prohibited the import of military equipment,
they failed to effectively curtail the Rhodesian rebellion."

In response,

the Security Council unanimously adopted more extensive sanctions in
1968.11 The new resolutions prohibited the movement of any products
to and from Southern Rhodesia, except for foodstuffs and medical sup35
plies in humanitarian circumstances.
Similarly in 1977, the Security Council attempted to use mandatory
sanctions, and not military force, to abolish repression under a white
minority government-this time in South Africa.36 Resolution 418,
adopted unanimously, called upon all nations to cease the supply of

military equipment to South Africa.37 As with Southern Rhodesia, the
sanctions failed to result in immediate change.3 8 Within ten years, how-

ever, other nations individually followed the Security Council's lead
and imposed their own sanctions on additional commodities.3 " In
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the Security Council approved
32. S.C. Res 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) at 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/
Rev.l (1966). The Security Council implemented mandatory economic sanctions because voluntary sanctions had not affected the control of the white minority regime. R.
Zacklin, supra note 27, at 48. The Council also noted that the failure of nations to
implement the mandatory sanctions would violate article 25 of the Charter which provided that members agreed to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council.
Id. at 50; see also Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973) (recognizing resolution 232 in the context of an Executive Order
that established criminal sanctions for violating the embargo against Southern
Rhodesia).
33. See R. Zacklin, supra note 27, at 51 (noting that the United Nations Special
Committee on Decolonization condemned South Africa and Portugal for defying the
resolution and recommended stronger sanctions).
34. S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (1428th mtg.) at 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/
Rev.l (1968); see R. Zacklin, supra note 27. at 51 (detailing the events that preceded
the Security Council's vote on resolution 253).
35. See R. Zacklin, supra note 27, at 52 (noting that the Security Council could do
little more than reaffirm the importance of sanctions and attempt to elicit member
nations' compliance). Other African countries, such as South Africa. failed to adhere
to the sanctions, and the Security Council could not succeed in defeating the white
minority regime that created a racially separatist government in 1969. Id.
36. 1977 U.N.Y.B. 133, U.N. Sales No. E.79.1.1.
37. S.C. Res. 418, 31 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) at 4-6. U.N. Doc. S/INF/33
(1977). This resolution prohibited the sale of all military equipment and spare parts
used for military purposes. Id.
38. See 1978 U.N.Y.B. 184, U.N. Sales No. E.80.1.1 (describing the Security
Council's condemnation of South Africa's refusal to comply wvith the previous year's
resolution).
39. See Carter, InternationalEconomic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S.
Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1162, 1176 (1987) (opining that American sanctions

against South Africa were a necessary supplement to the United Nations sanctions).
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sanctions, but did not enforce them using the military as it did a decade later when Iraq invaded Kuwait.40
II.

THE GENEVA CONVENTION

When United States officials first mentioned the use of economic
sanctions following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they made their public
statements carefully, choosing the words "interdiction" and "embargo"

rather than "blockade." 41 These cautious statements reflected not only
a concern for public opinion, but also an awareness of the legal effect
of using the military to enforce Security Council resolutions. 2 Calling
the action a military "blockade" could invoke claims that the situation
had become an armed conflict, requiring adherence to the laws of warfare and restricting the extent of the embargo's scope to protect civilians.4 3 Subsequently, the Security Council passed resolution 665, authorizing the use of military force to enforce economic sanctions, which
ended the need for such cautious statements. 4 4 Immediately following

the vote, officials acknowledged that the embargo had become a blockade; 45 a military operation requiring adherence to the laws of armed

40. See Goshko, supra note 4, at Al (describing the unprecedented nature of the
Security Council's actions); Shannon & Eaton, U.N. Retaliates with Embargo on Oil,
Arms, L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al (noting the historical setting for the Security
Council's action in the embargo of Iraq and Kuwait).
41. See Brenner, Why the Word "Blockade" Won't Pass U.S. Lips, Boston Globe,
Aug. 14, 1990, at 3 (citing the Bush Administration's acknowledgement of the significance of referring to its actions as a blockade).
42. See id. (commenting that officials neither wanted the country to view the actions as a use of force, nor viewed the actions in a manner that would require adherence to the laws of warfare).
43. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that Secretary of State James Baker
avoided using the term blockade because he recognized that it implied activities carried
out only in wartime).
44. S.C. Res. 665 (1990).
45. See Miller, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

7-34 (1989) (defining a blockade as a belligerent

activity that prevented all ships and aircraft from entering the enemy nation for the
purpose of supplying contraband (citing THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE (U), art.
632(a), NWIP 10-2, Department of the Navy (1955)); Jones, The International Law
of Maritime Blockade-A Measure of Naval Economic Interdiction, 26 How. L.J. 759,
760 (1983) (outlining the development of the law of naval blockade); see also THE
LONDON DECLARATION CONCERNING THE LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE,

S.Doc. No.

563, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 26-34 (1914) (describing the foundation of modern laws regarding naval blockade).
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conflict,46 including the 1949 Geneva Conventions"7 and the Protocols
of 1977.48

A.

1949 CONVENTIONS

The 1949 Geneva Conventions resulted from concern by the International Committee of the Red Cross over the devastating treatment of
combatants and civilians in World War II.4 Sixty-three nations participated in revising and codifying the humanitarian law"e of armed conflict. 1 The resulting Conventions became universally accepted law affecting the treatment of prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, and
civilians during wartime.52
The Fourth Geneva Convention included laws concerning the use of
blockade and its effect upon the civilian population."3 The drafters of
46. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary on Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 20 (J. Pictet ed.
1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTiONS]. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War defined an armed
conflict as any conflict which resulted in the use of the military. Id.
47. See supra note 5 (citing the four Geneva Conventions).
48. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. and Relating to the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted
in, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
49. See generally Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, supra note 46, at 3
(describing the historical setting of the Geneva Conventions, and noting that previous
Conventions had failed to sufficiently protect civilians from starvation and suffering
during the Second World War).
50. See Solf, Protection of Civilians against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary InternationalLaw and under Protocol I. I Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 117, 117
(1986) (noting that humanitarian law developed over centuries of warfare from the
recognition that suffering by the civilian population reduces the intended effects of military actions).
51. International Comm. on the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 2-5 (1986) [hereinafter IT"L CONMI.

ON THE RED

CROSS]. The 1949 Geneva

Conventions revised the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and the Hague Conventions on
Naval Warfare of 1899 and 1907. Id; see E. ROSENBLAo, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT-SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
AND RELATED PROBLEMtS 43-45 (1977) (citing the English translation of the Hague

Conventions in THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at

42 (1915)).
52. See Int'l Comm. on the Red Cross, supra note 51, at 7-22 (describing the creation of the Four Geneva Conventions, and summarizing the major portions of each). As
of 1990, 166 nations have become parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Roberts,
Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-OccupiedTerritory since 1967, 84 A?.i. J.
INT'L L. 44, 53 (1990).
53. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 23. See Jones, supra note 45, at
777-78 (interpreting article 23 in terms of the history of naval blockade and noting that
article 23 created greater protections for the civilian population during a blockade).
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the Fourth Convention relied upon the historical effectiveness of a
blockade. 4 Historically, blockade warfare succeeded by cutting off all
supplies and suppressing the opposing military's operations. 5 A blockade had equally adverse effects upon the civilian population.56 Blockading forces quarantined products intended for civilians out of fear that
the opposing military forces would take control of those products and
thus, reduce the blockade's effectiveness. 51
In response to this historical analysis, the Geneva delegates enacted

article 23. Article 23 prohibited belligerent parties from impeding the
free passage of relief consignments to civilians during an economic
blockade. 58 Under this article, a party that wanted to impose a blockade had to meet three conditions: (1) that the military would not divert
materials; (2) that the blockading party would effectively control distribution; and (3) that the materials would not give the military an unfair
advantage.5 9 Delegates worried that the provisions ignored a large por-

tion of the civilian population because they applied only to young children and expectant mothers.6 0 Delegates also worried that article 23

gave the blockading party overly broad discretion in determining when
relief supplies could pass freely. 1 During the 1960s and 1970s, these
54. See Jones, supra note 45, at 765-75 (describing the modern history of the use
of a naval blockade); Rosenblad, supra note 51, at 110 (explaining that military forces
have used the blockade effectively since the late 1500s, when Dutch forces prevented
Spanish navigation of the ports of Flanders); COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 46, at 178 (noting that the use of blockade as a military option has
increased with the rise of economic interdependence).
55. See Rosenblad, supra note 51, at 110-14 (noting the effectiveness of blockade
as a means of warfare).
56. See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 46, at 178 (noting how quickly the civilian population feels the adverse effects of a blockade); see also
ROSENBLAD, supra note 51, at 118 (describing the effects of a blockade).
57. See Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 Int'l Law. 228, 229 (1970)
(describing the blockade of Biafra, where more than 10,000 people died daily of
starvation).
58. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 23. Article 23 provides that the
blockading party shall allow the free passage of all religious objects, medical supplies,
and foodstuffs intended for children and expectant mothers. Id. at para. 1.
59. Id. at para. 2. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 39296 (1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (defining military necessity in the context of article 35, regarding limitations on the right of belligerent parties to choose their means of warfare); see also Mudge, supra note 57, at 23844 (discussing the theory of military necessity using the examples of the Paris blockade
in 1870, the Southern blockades during the American Civil War, and the German
blockade in World War II).
60. See Rosenblad, supra note 51, at 114 (noting that at the Convention, the Soviet
delegate, representing the concerns of other nations, argued that article 23 did not
reach far enough to secure free passage of relief supplies without any restrictions).
61. Id.
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two concerns culminated in controversy over the scope of article 23 as
an internationally binding obligation to protect civilians from the effect
62
of blockade.
B. 1977 PROTOCOLS
These arguments led to the creation of articles 54 and 70 in the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 3 The Protocols had

two primary goals. First, they tried to affirm the importance of the
principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Second, they attempted to

clarify and supplement specific provisions of the original Convention,
such as the law of blockade. 4 Specifically, article 54 of Protocol I prohibited the use of starvation as a type of warfare.65 In addition, the new

protocol regulated the effects of blockade on all civilians, instead of
only protecting children and the most needy.6 6

Article 70 of Protocol I further required that the blockading powers
provide relief to all civilians who did not have sufficient food and medical supplies because of military actions. 7 Following article 54, article
62. Protocol I, Protocol II, supra note 48; see Mudge, supra note 57. at 253 (arguing that article 23 did not create a binding obligation as it left too much discretion to
the blockading party).
63. See Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 59, at 20 (noting that
the purpose of creating the Protocols was to supplement, not replace, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions).
64. Id. see Solf, supra note 50, at 129-35 (noting that Protocol I attempted to: (1)
strengthen the distinction between military and civilian objects; (2) clarify the regulations prohibiting attack on the civilian population; (3) emphasize precautions taken to
protect civilians from attack; and (4) provide more specific legal protection to civilians); see also Gasser, Agora: Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; An Appeal for
Ratification by the United States, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 912, 924 (1987) (noting that
Protocol I resulted from nations recognizing the need to update the Geneva Conventions following wars in the 1960s in Vietnam, the Middle East, and in Africa).
65. Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 54(1). The other pertinent sections of article 54
provide for a prohibition of the destruction or removal of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
and drinking water with the specific goal of starving the civilian population. Id. art.
54(2); see Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief during Armed Conflict: The Modern
HumanitarianLaw, 19 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 59-68 (1989) (analyzing the significance of article 54 in protecting civilians from starvation).
66. See 3 H. LEvIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 227-57 (1980) (noting how the protocol added protections for all
civilians, as documented by the legislative history of article 54 and the many draft
proposals that the delegation to the Convention submitted); Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 59, at 652 (noting that while blockades aim to deprive
armies, and not civilians, history has shown that civilians suffer most from the effects of
a blockade). See also M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCHE & W. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICf S
OF ARMED CONFLICT 336-42 (1982) (describing the evolution of article 54 and its necessity in modern rules of warfare).
67. Protocol I, supra note 48, art. 70. Article 70 states that the distribution of
supplies and personnel actions should depend upon a showing of humanitarian purposes

and impartiality. Id; see

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,

supra note
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70 shifted the military emphasis of the 1949 principles to civilian necessities.6 8 Shipments of essential supplies now depended upon the extent of the civilian population's suffering, instead of upon the risk involved in giving the military an unfair advantage. 9 The principles
found in articles 54 and 70 represented a new view of blockade in
terms of its non-military effect, as well as a codification of customary
70
principles acknowledged by all nations.

C.

GENEVA CONVENTIONS AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

At the commencement of the Iraqi blockade in August 1990, only
sixty-eight countries had ratified Protocol 1.71 Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union, the two countries leading the Security
Council blockade against Iraq, had adopted the Protocol.72 The Protocol, therefore, would not limit the scope of the embargo,73 unless that
the laws of blockade in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I
had become principles of customary international law, requiring the ad74
herence of all nations.
Customary international law results from the general and consistent
observance of nations, exhibiting a sense of legal obligation (opinio
59, at 817-18 (stating that humanitarian circumstances and impartiality must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to prevent deception).
68. See Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 59, at 817-22 (emphasizing the need for civilian protection to govern the distribution of relief supplies).
69. Protocol I, supra note 48, art. 70. While still acknowledging that the blockading nation can prevent shipments that would give the opposing military an unfair advantage, article 70 states that such situations depend on the need of the civilian population, and the urgency of providing food and supplies in the specific situations.
Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 59, at 817-18; see Allen, supra
note 65, at 16 (noting that military necessity and humanitarian values can exist in
mutual consistency).
70. See Solf, supra note 50, at 135 (noting that Protocol I represented the reaffirmation of humanitarian laws of warfare).
71. See Gasser, supra note 64, at 915 (refuting the reason the United States gave
for refusing to ratify the Protocols, which was that ratification would give legitimacy
and legal protection to terrorist organizations).
72. See id. at 915 (commenting that while several "western" nations signed onto
the Protocols, neither the United States nor the Soviet bloc countries had become parties to the Protocols). See also Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protectionof War Victims (Cont'd), 82 Am. J.
Int'l L. 784 (1987) (explaining that from a military, political and humanitarian standpoint, the United States could not ratify Protocol 1).
73. See H. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 622, 630-31 (1972)
(noting that traditionally, states retain the right to abstain from obligations under treaties that they have not ratified).
74. See Penna, Customary InternationalLaw and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some
Provisions, in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross
Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet 201, 203 (1984) (noting that a treaty binds nonparties only through principles of customary international law).
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juris) to binding principles.71 Treaties provide evidence of customary
international law,7 6 yet customary international law binds, nonparties as
well as parties to a treaty.7 7 Following these principles in North Sea

Continental Shelf, the International Court of Justice established the
necessary criteria for a law to become a principle of customary interna-

tional law. 78 The court wrote that: (1) the law must exhibit characteristics regarded as fundamental norms of international law, taking into

account the subject matter and nature of the obligations;79 and (2) extensive and uniform state practice must exist, acknowledging an understanding of the binding international legal obligation.8"
The provisions of the Geneva Conventions relating to the use of
blockade exhibit characteristics of customary international law, and
therefore, bind the United States and other blockading countries. 8' The
universal acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, like the univer-

sal acceptance of the laws of human rights, creates peremptory norms
(jus cogens)8 2 regarding the principles of blockade. 83 Three factors illustrate the international community's universal acceptance of the Ge-

neva Conventions. First, 164 nations ratified the treaty, and over 120
75. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (defining customary international law); see
also Charney, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 975 (1986) (analyzing the effects of multinational
agreements on the Restatement's definition of customary international law).
76. Restatement, supra note 75, § 102 comment i.
77. See Charney, supra note 75, at 973 (stating the proposition that customary
international law may bind nonparties (citing Restatement, supra note 75, § 102 comment f)).
78. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 41 (Feb. 20).
79. See Penna, supra note 74, at 204 (noting that the court in North Sea never
explicitly stated how to determine the nature of the obligations, except through explicit
state acceptance of a treaty or state practice sufficient to show adherence to the
norms).
80. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42. Rules become customary
international law on the basis of subsequent impact and state practice. Id. see Comment, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of InternationalLaw, 68
B.U.L. Rev. 773, 788 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Interdiction] (using the North
Sea criteria in determining binding customary international law); see also Charney,
supra note 75, at 983 (noting that determinations of customary international law must
account for the nature of the subject matter, the nature of the negotiations, the nature
of the obligation, and the nature of the rule).
81. See Allen, supra note 65, at 44 (discussing how the Geneva Conventions have
become customary international law through the universal strength of the humanitarian principles therein).
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23,
1969, art. 54., U.N. Doe. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int'l. L. 875
(1969). Article 53 provides that a treaty cannot conflict with a peremptory norm of
international law, which is a universally accepted principle from which states may not
derogate. Id. art. 53.
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convened to draft the Protocols.84 Second, the Conventions and certain
provisions in the Protocols "crystallized" universally recognized rules of
warfare that were not previously codified in treaty form. 85 For example,
in 1970, the United Nations General Assembly voted unanimously to
provide relief to civilians in wartime. 88 In 1977, article 70 of Protocol I
codified this concept, when it required that belligerent nations allow

87
opposing forces to provide relief supplies to civilians.

Third, nations that were not parties to the Convention, such as the
United States, have acknowledged the prohibition of specific human

rights violations as customary international law. 88 Prohibitions against
genocide, torture, and slavery have attained jus cogens status, thereby

prohibiting any derogation by treaty or act. 89 For example, United
States officials, while refusing to ratify the Protocols, have clearly
stated that violations of human rights, such as the starvation of the
civilian population, have achieved the status of customary international
law. 90
83. See Allen, supra note 65, at 44 (noting that the international community's expectation that states will adhere to the Geneva Conventions and the Nicaraguadecision
strengthen the status of the Conventions as customary international law).
84. See Meron, Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 348 n.2
(1987) (stating that the Geneva Conventions have 159 members, five more than are
member-states of the United Nations); see also Soilf, supra note 50, at 124 (noting that
the general principles of the Geneva Conventions have become customary law because
of their universal acceptance).
85. See Penna, supra note 74, at 202-24 (discussing how certain provisions of Protocol I, specifically articles 48, 51, 54, and 70 have crystallized into customary international law); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42 (stating generally
how treaties create customary international law through the codification of universally
recognized principles). This Comment does not attempt to analyze whether all of the
Additional Protocols have achieved the status of customary international law. The provisions relating to blockade, specifically articles 54 and 70, have met the North Sea
criteria, and can be considered extensions of the customary law provisions of the 1949
Conventions. See Soilf, supra note 50, at 129 (noting that Protocol I reinforces the
customary international law principles found in the 1949 Conventions).
86. G.A. Res. 2677, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
87. Protocol I, supra note 48, art. 70.
88. See Meron, supra note 84, at 361 (noting that countries recognize most humanitarian principles as customary international law because of the offensive nature of
human rights violations).
89. See Restatement, supra note 75, § 702 (providing examples of violations considered by the United States as jus cogens).
90. M. Matheson, Remarks at the Symposium on International Humanitarian Law
at the Washington College of Law, American University (Jan. 22, 1987), reprinted in
Allen, supra note 65, at 84. Mr. Matheson, deputy legal adviser for the United States
Department of State, said that the Reagan Administration's support of the prohibition
against civilian starvation during wartime, found in articles 54 and 70 of the Geneva
Council, is based upon the general offensiveness and the universal condemnation of
such acts. Id.
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Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions also met the second criterion
under North Sea by requiring that state practice conform to the obser-

vance of fundamental norms."1 The actions of the United Nations and
holdings of the International Court of Justice indicate the acceptance
of the Geneva Conventions and related provisions of the 1977 Addi-

tional Protocols as customary international law. 2 In 1971, two General
Assembly resolutions recognized the international acceptance of the
Geneva Conventions, and called upon all nations, including those that
were not parties to the Conventions, to observe the principles of the
Conventions during armed conflict.9 3 In 1986, the International Court

of Justice recognized the Geneva Conventions as binding customary international law in the case of Nicaragua v. United States." Finally, in
1990, the Security Council adopted resolutions 666 and 670, emphasizing the binding requirements of the Geneva Conventions that applied to
the protection of foreigners held against their will in Kuwait.9 5
91. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42; see also Comment, Legality of Economic Sanctions under International Law: The Case of Nicaragua, 43
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 167, 173-74 (1986) (arguing that a state may not always follow
customary law out of a sense of legal obligation, but instead because of political
expediency).
92. See R. Higgins, supra note 30, at 2 (viewing at the United Nations resolutions
as indicators of the development of customary law); see also Comment, Interdiction,
supra note 80, at 790 (noting that correspondence, press releases, judicial decisions,
treaties, and United Nations resolutions provide examples of state practice); Allen.
supra note 65, at 45 (noting that the concept of state practice has extended to United
Nations resolutions and International Court of Justice decisions). But see D'Amato,
Trashing Customary International Law, 81 A-o. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (1987) (noting
the traditional view that state practice does not necessarily include United Nations
resolutions or international tribunal decisions).
93. G.A. Res. 2852, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 2853, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 29) at 91. UN Doc. A/8429
(1971). Both of these resolutions emphasize the protection of human rights and call
upon all nations to adhere to humanitarian laws of armed conflict, specifically the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Id.
94. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 113. The court stated that article 3,
common to all four Geneva Conventions, expressed previous humanitarian principles
and developed new ones. Id. at 114. The court also cited the two General Assembly
resolutions in determining that the Geneva Conventions had evolved into customary
international law. Id. at 99-100; see supra note 97 (describing the resolutions).
95. S.C. Res. 666 (1990); S.C. Res. 670 (1990). The operative clause 2 of resolution 666 reads:
Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution
664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains
fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance %%ith international
humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention.
S.C. Res. 666 (1990).
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THE EFFECT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
ON THE IRAQI BLOCKADE

Curiously, while the Security Council recognized the binding nature
of the Geneva Conventions as they applied to Iraq's treatment of detained foreigners, 8 the Council never mentioned the Conventions with
regard to its own actions relating to the blockade.9" Resolution 666,
which required the monitoring of humanitarian conditions in Iraq and
Kuwait, parallels many of the provisions in the Geneva Conventions
that address this same issue.9 The Security Council, however, chose to
determine the conditions necessitating relief through the recommendations of a sanctions committee, instead of utilizing the binding requirements of the Geneva Conventions. 9
III.

THE HIERARCHY OF OBLIGATIONS: ARTICLE 103
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.

ARTICLE

103

Whether the Security Council may supersede the Geneva Conventions depends first upon an interpretation of article 103 of the United
Nations Charter.1"' Article 103 states that obligations to the United
Nations take precedent over all other international obligations of member-nations. 10 1 The Security Council originally drafted this article to
address three potential conflicts that arose between United Nations
treaties and other international obligations: (1) conflicts between the
96. S.C. Res. 666 (1990); S.C. Res. 670 (1990); see supra note 95 (citing the relevant provisions of resolution 666).
97. See Roth, If Iraq Went to Court, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1990, at A23 (noting
that the blockading powers could challenge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's violations of the Geneva Conventions in a courtroom as long as the blockading powers themselves adhered to the Conventions).
98. Compare S.C. Res. 666 (1990) (requiring the Committee to monitor children,
expectant mother, the sick, and the elderly) with Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 5, art. 23, para. I (providing for the supply of foodstuffs to children, expectant
mothers, and maternity cases). See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing
resolution 666 and the actions taken by the Security Council to determine when to send
humanitarian relief).
99. S.C. Res. 666 (1990); see Middle East Watch, Press Release 3 (Aug. 29,
1990), (noting that in the situation of armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions would
require the blockading powers to allow relief shipments to reach the Iraqi people).
100. U.N. Charter, art. 103; see supra note 8 (citing article 103 from the proposition that Security Council obligations take precedent over other treaty obligations).
101. Id. See generally Flory, Article 103, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIS 1373
(Cot and Pellet eds. 1985) (providing an interpretation of article 103 and a brief history of United Nations debate concerning article 103).
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United Nations Charter and treaties entered into before the drafting of

the Charter; (2) conflicts between the Charter and treaties entered into
after the Charter's creation; and (3) conflicts between the Charter and
treaties with parties that are not members of the United Nations.1 02

Article 103 does not explicitly state whether customary international
law encompasses these conflicts.103 Furthermore, the United Nations

and other international bodies have applied article 103 only to cases in
which specific treaties have conflicted with United Nations obligations.1 04 While article 103 established the international supremacy of

the United Nations, interpretations of the article fail to resolve the conflicts between the United Nations Charter and other international

obligations. 105
1. Drafting of the United Nations Charter
The drafters of the Charter sought to create a hierarchy of interna-

tional law through article 103, but never clearly resolved the conflict of
obligations.'

6

Article 103 is the product of traditional theories of

treaty interpretation and preceding treaties regarding the structure of
the United Nations. 10 7 While broadening the traditional norm that a
prior treaty takes precedence over a later conflicting treaty, 0 8 article
103 limited the ability of the United Nations to abrogate inconsistent
obligations. 09 Article 103 stated that the Charter would supersede, not

revoke, other treaties, thus allowing conflicting treaties to remain in
102. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO &
TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 614

A. SINIONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA(1969) (noting that the drafters recognized

the possibility of conflict and sought to reaffirm the superiority of the United Nations);
see also Flory, supra note 101, at 1373 (stating that the conflicts arise in the three
categories based on the exact significance of the hierarchy and the judicial effects of

having incompatible treaties).
103. Flory, supra note 101, at 1373.
104. Id. at 1378.
105. Id. Flory notes that the drafters' intentions and the history of debate on article
103 show the required hierarchy of obligations. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1373.
108. See R. Higgins, supra note 30, at 274-75 (explaining the traditional norms
regarding treaty priorities and noting that the Charter required precedence over any

treaties made before and after the ratification of the Charter).
109. See Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 20 (providing the original proposition that all member-nations will not enter into agreements inconsistent with the
terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations); see also KELSE'-. supra note 25, at
11 (comparing the provisions of article 20 of the Covenant to article 103 of the
Charter).

626
force.'
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Only explicit conflicts with obligations under the United Na-

tions Charter would challenge the legitimacy of prior treaties."'
Article 103 thus created a hierarchy of international law giving the
United Nations limited superiority through its Charter obligations over
states and regional organizations." 2 This primacy depended not upon
the creation of any specific fundamental norms in article 103, but

rather, upon the universal acceptance of the United Nations as an international arbiter."' In general, article 103 announced in broad terms

the significance of the United Nations, while remaining ambiguous as
to the resolution of treaty conflicts and the extent to which the Charter
should prevail over the obligations of non-members."" This result
placed United Nations law in higher standing than other treaties, but
left its scope undefined.1

5

110. U.N. Charter, art. 103; see KELSEN, supra note 25, at 112-13 (interpreting
article 103 as not automatically revoking conflicting treaties and other international
obligations).
111. See R. Russell, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED STATES 1940-45, at 921 (1958) (noting that the drafters of the Charter
questioned the automatic abrogation of inconsistent treaties and believed that article 20
went too far in forcing states to question the validity of past treaties); see also GoODRICH, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 102, at 615 (noting that the
drafters preferred that the United Nations did not have automatic power under the
Charter to abrogate inconsistent obligations).
112. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 11l, at 922 (noting that article 103 was eventually drafted to give the Charter superiority if conflict should arise, but was not meant
to automatically supersede every new agreement); see also MacDonald, The Charterof
the United Nations and the Development of Fundamental Principles of International
Law, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
GEORG SCHWARTZENBERGER 196, 204-05 (1989) (noting that Article 103 established
United Nations law as hierarchically superior to other laws as the direct result of article 20 of the Covenant).
113. See Report on the Law of Treaties, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37 U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1977 (noting that the large number of states represented in the
United Nations has rendered debate about the application of article 103 unnecessary);
MacDonald, FundamentalNorms in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 1987 CANAD.
Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 122 (1987) (describing article 103 and the United Nations Charter
as deriving their status from the role of the United Nations as a promoter of peace and
security in international law).
114. See Report of the Rapporteur of Committee, U.N. C.I.O. Doc. 933, IV/2/
42(2), at 5, reprinted in H. Kelsen, supra note 25, at 188 n,81 (noting the relative
unimportance of the manner in which a conflict arises from obligations under the Charter). The report concentrates, instead, on the conflict itself, specifically using the example of economic sanctions. Id.; see also supra note 102, at 615 (stating that article 103
failed to define conflicts); Flory, supra note 101, at 1374 (noting that article 103
neither defines conflict, nor mentions who shall determine when a conflict exists).
115. See MacDonald, supra note 113, at 126 (commenting on the uniqueness of
article 103, but noting that neither the United Nations nor international courts have
determined the extent of the article's application in the hierarchy of treaties and customary law).
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2. Subsequent Use of Article 103
Later treaties that mentioned article 103 did not clarify this ambiguity. 18 Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties," 7

which codified traditional rules of treaty-making, provided that the obligations of parties to successive treaties must fall within the provisions
of article 103 of the United Nations Charter. 1 8 By citing article 103,
the drafters of the Vienna Convention explicitly recognized the importance of the United Nations and the significance of the Charter as it
related to international treaty obligations." 9 The Vienna Convention,
however, did not directly address the issue of conflicts that arose between treaties and the Charter. 20 Furthermore, the Vienna Convention
did not elaborate on the meaning of article 103 or deviate from the

article's broad acceptance of specific situations in which the Charter
would take precedence over customary international law. 2'

Regional charters present similar ambiguities concerning conflicting
obligations. 22 The Charter of the Organization of American States
(OAS)' 23 and the Charter of the European Economic Community
116. Id. at 125.
117. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J.
Int'l. L. 875 (1969).
118. Id. Article 30 provides that rights and obligations under the Vienna Convention shall be determined in accordance with article 103 of the United Nations Charter.
Id. art. 30. The Vienna Convention opened for signature in May 1969, and entered into
force in 1980. Id. As of 1986, fifty-two states had ratified the Convention. Id. The
United States has not become a party to the Convention. J. SwEENEv, C. OuvER, &
N.

LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

993-94 (3d ed. 1988). The United

States Department of State regards the Vienna Convention as authoritative because
the Convention codifies both customary international law and United States foreign
relations law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 3 (intro. note) (1987).
119. See Lauwaars, The Interrelationship between United Nations Law and the
Law of Other International Organizations, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1604, 1605-06 (1984)
(noting that article 30 of the Vienna Convention reaffirmed the superiority of the Charter created in article 103).
120. See MacDonald, supra note 113, at 125 (discussing how the drafters of the
Vienna Conventions deliberately left open questions regarding the applicability of article 103).
121. Id.
122. See Acevedo, The Right of Members of the Organization of American States
to Refer Their "Local" Disputes Directly to the United Nations Security Council, 4
Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 25, 26 (1989) (indicating that the organizations and the
courts have not completely resolved the conflicts between the OAS Charter and the
United Nations Charter); see also Lauwaars, supra note 119, at 1609-10 (stating the
legal obligations under the United Nations Charter of members of the European Economic Community).
123. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948. art. 1372
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter OAS Charter).
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(EEC) 2 " both refer to article 103, recognizing members' obligations to
the United Nations over the obligations to the regional organizations.

25

Article 23 of the OAS Charter, however, provides that the

OAS shall have priority over the Security Council to hear the claims of
member-nations. 126 This article directly challenges the authority of the
Security Council under article 24, and the superiority of the United
Nations Charter under article 103.127 Neither the OAS nor the United
Nations has ever definitively resolved this conflict. 128
3.

United Nations Resolutions
United Nations debates have most often addressed article 103 in the

context of conflicts with regional organization treaties.' 29 In 1954, Guatemala argued that a conflict existed between obligations under the

OAS and those under the United Nations Charter.130 Similarly, in
1960, Cuba cited article 103 in an attempt to prevent the OAS from

hearing its complaint against the United States.' 3' Along with later
124. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 224, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958).
125. See Lauwaars, supra note 119, at 1611 (recognizing that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains an express provision recognizing the obligations under United Nations law). Unlike the GATT, the treaty creating the Benelux
Economic Union contains no such provision. Treaty Instituting the Benelux Economic
Union, Feb. 3, 1958, art. 9, Belgium-Luxembourg-Netherlands, 381 U.N.T.S. 165
(1960).
126. OAS Charter, art. 23. See Acevedo, supra note 122, at 28 (stating that article
23 initiated the debate over the priority of OAS jurisdiction in relation to Security
Council jurisdiction). The International Court of Justice addressed the exercise of regional jurisdiction by the OAS in the Nicaraguacase. Id. at 27; see infra notes 138-56
and accompanying text (detailing the Nicaragua decision).
127. See Acevedo, supra note 122, at 28 (describing how article 23 of the OAS
Charter, as originally drafted in 1948, conflicted with the hierarchy of obligations created by articles 24, 34, 35, and 103 of the United Nations Charter).
128. See id. at 26 (noting that many debates on the conflict reflect political decisions rather than attempts to define the hierarchy of obligations); see also infra notes
129-37 and accompanying text (describing United Nations resolutions interpreting article 103).
129. GOODRICH, supra note 102, at 616; see Flory, supra note 101, at 1376 (explaining that few of these debates refer to article 103 explicitly, but rather, they refer
to the superiority of the United Nations as the governing body).
130. 9 U.N. SCOR (675th mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/3907 (1954); see Acevedo,
supra note 122, at 34-35 (describing the Guatemalan situation).
131. 15 U.N. SCOR (875th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4395 (1960); 15 U.N.
GAOR (909th mtg.) at 787, U.N. Doc. A/PV 909 (1960); 15 U.N. GAOR (910th
mtg.) at 801, U.N. Doe. A/PV 910 (1960); see Acevedo, supra note 122, at 38-39
(detailing the Cuban request to have the Security Council, and not the OAS, address
its complaints against the United States). The Security Council agreed to address Cuban allegations of United States aggression and reprisal in early 1961. Id. Cuba failed
to obtain the necessary support, and the complaint remained tabled until April 15,
1961, when the United States commenced the Bay of Pigs invasion. Id.
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cases involving the dispute in Southern Rhodesia" 2 and the use of force
by Turkey against Cyprus in 1963,133 the Security Council raised the
issue of article 103 superiority, and then either tabled or simply ignored
the debate.""
The United Nations' infrequent reference to article 103 reflects a
reluctance to confront the issue of under what circumstances article
103 should grant supremacy to the Security Council or other governing
bodies.'3 5 Furthermore, the United Nations members appear to view
article 103 as a reaffirmation of the superiority of the United Nations
as an international governing body, rather than as a tool to resolve the
conflicts that arise between allegiance to the United Nations and other
international obligations.136 These actions by the United Nations reinforce the ambiguity and generality of article 103 that make determination of where customary international law fits into the United Nations
1 37
scheme a difficult task.

132. 17 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1355th mtg.) at PP. 56-57, U.N. Doe. A/C.4/SR.1355
(1963); 17 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1434th mtg.) at PP. 7- 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.1434
(1963), cited in 5 Repertory of United Nations Practice 207 (Supp. 11 1966); see supra
notes 27-35 and accompanying text (describing the Southern Rhodesia rebellion).
133. 18 U.N. SCOR (1085th mtg.) at para. 61-65, 38-43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1085
(1963). The conflict between Cyprus and Turkey arose from the Treaty of Guarantee,
that addressed the establishment of Cyprus as an independent state. Id. The Turkish
representative argued in the United Nations that the treaty provided for the use of
force in Cyprus. Id. at para. 67. The Cypriot representative argued that the treaty
could not supersede the article 103 obligations to observe United Nations resolutions,
that, in this case, guaranteed the right of Cyprus to prevent the use of force by Turkey.
Id.; see 19 U.N. SCOR (1095th mtg.) at PP. 36-40, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1095 (1964); 20
U.N. SCOR (1234th mtg.) at PP. 123-126, 132-137, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1234 (1965),
cited in 5 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE at 211 (Supp.

11 1966) (detail-

ing the Cyprus conflict).
134. See GOODRICH, supra note 102, at 616 (noting that, especially with regard to
the OAS Charter, the members of the Security Council have avoided discussion of
article 103); see also 5 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANs 315-20
(1955); Id. at 507 (Supp. 1 1959); Id. at 201-15 (Supp. 11 1966); Id. at 366-71 (Supp.
III 1969); id. at 168-72 (Supp. IV 1978) (citing the debates in each of the United
Nations bodies which mentioned article 103).
135. See GOODRICH, supra note 102, at 616 (noting the reluctance of the United
Nations to deal with the issue of conflicts arising under article 103).
136. 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (993d mtg.), at P. 31, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/SR.993 (1967).
In a 1967 debate in the Sixth Committee regarding the relationships of states under
the United Nations Charter, the delegate to the United States commented that article
20 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reaffirmed the importance of
maintaining obligations to the United Nations Charter above all other obligations, specifically concerning the use of force. Id.
137. See Flory, supra note 101, at 1378 (commenting that the infrequent application of article 103 by the United Nations does not answer questions regarding its application, but reaffirms the important status of the Charter in international law).
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NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES

The International Court of Justice addressed the issues raised by the
Security Council debates in Nicaragua v. United States.'3 8 The court
resolved the conflict between customary and Charter law in favor of
customary international law.13 9 The majority held that the principles
under the United Nations Charter may not supersede customary international law regarding the use of force in international conflict. 140 The
United States argued that only article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter governed their actions,14 1 and, because of a multilateral treaty
reservation made by the United States in ratifying the Charter, the
court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. 42 The majority held that
customary international law retained a separate identity from the
Charter concerning the use of force.143 The court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the dispute regarding the violations of customary rules
144
on the use of force.
In its analysis, the Nicaragua court also acknowledged that the Geneva Conventions applied as customary international law. 4 5 Although
Nicaragua, which had brought the action trying to supersede the
United States reservation, chose not to argue the application of the Geneva Conventions, the court itself raised their applicability," 6 citing article 3, a provision defining the rules of armed conflict in non-international conflict, as constituting principles of customary law even in cases
138. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.i. at 14.
139. Id.; see Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
93, 96 (1987) (noting that the law in the United Nations Charter closely resembled
that of customary international law, and the court chose to strengthen the application
of customary law).
140. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 94. The majority noted that customary international law exists and applies separately from the United Nations Charter with regard to the use of force, as the Charter does not explicitly address every
issue in this area. Id. at 94-96.
141. Id. at 82; see U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4) (prohibiting the threat or use of force
by any member, as such actions undermine the United Nations purposes).
142. Id.; see Christenson, supra note 139, at 94 (noting that the United States
contended that the Vandenberg reservation applied). The United States raised the issue
of a conflict between the effects of a treaty reservation and customary international
law. Id.
143. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 95.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 114. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text (describing the recognition of the Geneva Conventions as customary law).
146. See Meron, supra note 84, at 351 (noting that Nicaragua did not invoke the
Geneva Conventions in its pleading either because it did not want the court to view the
situation as an internal armed conflict, or because Nicaragua did not want its own
actions scrutinized under the terms of the Geneva Conventions).
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of international conflicts.1,417 While one of the judges questioned the uni-

lateral initiative of the court, in a concurring opinion, 45 the fact that
the majority of the Nicaraguacourt regarded the provisions as customary international law emphasized the international community's recognition of the Geneva Conventions as binding principles of humanitarian
49
law.1
The application of customary law as interpreted in the Nicaragua
decision applies similarly to the Security Council's implementation of
the Iraqi embargo.. 50 While noting the significance of the Charter in
international affairs, 15' the court in Nicaragua held that the Charter
does not cover the entire area of the use of force, and therefore could
not unilaterally apply over customary norms.52 Likewise in the present
case, Chapter VII of the Charter' 5 emphasizes the Security Council's
responsibility to assure international peace and security.5 4 Chapter VII
does not, however, extend as far as the Geneva Conventions in protecting civilians from the results of blockade warfare. 5 5 While it does not
minimize the importance of Charter obligations as defined by article
103, the Nicaraguadecision restricts the ability of the Security Council

to ignore the application of the Geneva Conventions to the Iraqi
blockade.' 56
147. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 114. The majority addressed the
Geneva Conventions as the basis of humanitarian rules applied to any armed conflict,
whether international or internal. Id.
148. Id. at 184. The separate opinion of Judge Ago expressed the judge's reluctance to apply the Geneva Conventions as customary international law. Id.
149. See Allen, supra note 65, at 44 (noting that the mention or article 3 by the
court underscored the strength of the Geneva Conventions); but see Meron, supra note
84, at 358 (noting that while the court's mention of the Geneva Conventions contributed to the consideration of the Geneva Conventions as customary law, the court did
not clarify their status as such).
150. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Geneva Conventions as customary international law).
151. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 96-97. The court noted that, in
determining customary international law, the judges must acknowledge the existence
and role of the Charter. Id.
152. Id. at 96.
153. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51; see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text
(noting the use of Chapter VII in the case of Southern Rhodesia).

154.

U.N.

CHARTER,

art. 51.

155. See Allen, supra note 65, at 48-54 (examining the accomplishments of the
United Nations in the area of humanitarian laws of warfare but also recognizing that
the 1977 Protocols regarding the treatment of civilians attempted to provide better
protection than previous laws).
156. See Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-96 (commenting that even
if a treaty and customary international law address the same issue, each must apply
separately).
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HIERARCHY OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

Following the Nicaragua decision, some commentators argued that
because the Charter already contained all existing principles of jus
cogens, the court did not need to conclude that customary norms exist
separately from the Charter. 157 Commentators stated that because the
Charter existed as a comprehensive and universally-binding treaty, it
implicitly and explicitly included all fundamental norms of international law.15 8 This view of an all-encompassing Charter ignored the fact
that the Charter was created years before the drafting of the Geneva
Conventions and the emergence of human rights law.Y59
In 1945, the drafters created the Charter as an outline for establishing a post-war international legal system."' 0 The Charter purposely
contained broad and general principles.""' For example, while article 55
of the Charter provided for the universal observance of human
rights, 16 2 the Charter did not provide for the specific protection of the
civilian population acknowledged in the later Geneva Conventions, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 3 and the Genocide Conventions. 6 4 Although the Charter may provide an underlying
basis for these specific developments, its provisions in the area of
human rights do not compare to the protection provided in these later

treaties."6 5 As Judge Azevedo of the International Court of Justice
157. See Flory, supra note 101, at 1377 (stating the view that the Charter contained all jus cogens principles regarding the use of force).
158. See MacDonald, supra note 112, at 202 (acknowledging the argument that
the broad range of subjects covered by the Charter suggests the explicit or implicit
inclusion of all principles of jus cogens); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 102
(noting that the Charter's principles regarding the use of force have become jus
cogens); Christenson, supra note 139, at 98 (commenting that consensus existed before
the Nicaragua decision).
159. See MacDonald, supra note 112, at 202 (commenting that human rights laws
have appeared mostly after the creation of the 1945 Charter).
160. Ciobanu, Impact of the Characteristicsof the Charterupon its Interpretation,
in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1975).
161. Id.; see also Riggs, The United Nations and the Development of International
Law, 1985 B.Y.U.L. REv. 411, 425 (1985) (emphasizing the expansive commitment
required by the Charter that results in its minimal impact upon the actions of a state).
162. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55; see D'Amato, Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1128 (1982) (recognizing the existence of
human rights law in treaties such as the United Nations Charter).
163. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res 2200, 21 GA-R Supp. (NO. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
164. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
165. See Ciobanu, supra note 160, at 37 (maintaining that the drafters intended
that the Charter create a framework which could adapt to changing societal conditions); see also MacDonald, supra note 112, at 202 (noting that certain principles con-
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noted in 1950, one should view the Charter as a means and not as an

end, in relation to changing societal concerns about the protection of
basic individual rights.166

Consequently, the human rights treaties enacted since 1945 have created a new hierarchy of international norms, with established principles

of humanitarian law taking precedence over the United Nations Charter, despite article

1 0 3 .1ea

In 1970, the International Court of Justice

recognized this hierarchy in the Barcelona Traction case. ' 8 The court
wrote that certain human rights create binding obligations above all
other duties of states.&1

9

These fundamental rights, such as the right

against slavery and genocide, would prevail over treaty law, including
treaties such as the Charter, which have binding characteristics of their
own.

17 0

D.

POLITICS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Beyond interpreting the Charter and its relation to customary law, a
determination of the effect of the Geneva Conventions on the Iraqi
blockade must also account for the political role of the Security Council.' In the Nicaragua case, the dissent viewed the Security Council
as a political organization rather than as a judicial body. 172 Resolutions

depended upon political choices rather than legal reasoningY7 The Security Council's current process for creating resolutions confirms the
tamined in the Charter have become more fully articulated since 1945, especially in the
areas of human rights and outer space law); Flory, supra note 101, at 1377 (insisting
that the Charter does not contain all the principles of jus cogens).
166. See Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 23-24 (Judgment of Mar. 3) (Azevedo, J. dissenting)
(recommending that the court should not interpret the United Nations Charter as a
rigid, uncompromising document, but should recognize that interpretations of the
Charter evolve in association with the growing acceptance of individual freedom and
international co-existence).
167. See T. MERON, HUtMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 173202 (1986) (analyzing the creation of a hierarchy of human rights norms).
168. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 5).
169. Id. at 32; see MERON, supra note 167, at 173-74 (stating that the creation of
a hierarchy resulted from dicta in the Barcelona decision which led to the International
Law Commission's adoption of specific prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and
apartheid).
170. See MERON, supra note 167, at 201 (noting that the creation of a hierarchy of
terms signifies the importance of human rights laws to the international community).
171. See generally R. HIGGINS, supra note 30, at 1-10 (noting that the political
bodies of the United Nations, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council,
may consider legal questions, but often do not make resolutions based upon those
questions).
172. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 290 (Schwebel, J. dissenting).
173. Id.

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 6:609

dissent's conclusion. 1 7 Although the Charter empowers the Security
Council to maintain international peace and security,"" the Council's
decisions result from consensus and the avoidance of a veto by one of
the five permanent members. 176 Security Council resolutions result
17
from political expediency rather than from any legal foundation. 7
By allowing the Security Council to supersede the Geneva Conventions, politics will govern the distribution of essential foodstuffs to civilian populations. 178 History has shown that politics can adversely affect
the individuals the Security Council seeks to protect.17 In 1950, the
Security Council followed its unanimous approval of the use of force
with a resolution providing relief supplies to the Korean people. 180 Political maneuvering resulted in a one-month delay between the vote on

the relief resolution and the first resolution.' 8 ' By the time the Council
voted and supplies reached Korea, the lack of food and medical sup1 82
plies had already adversely affected over 100,000 civilians.

The Security Council's embargo of Iraq differs from the Korean conflict only in the strength of the political alliance between the Soviet
Union and the United States within the Security Council.183 The threat
of veto from one of the superpowers is not presently a factor in creating
174. See Higgins, The Place of InternationalLaw in the Settlement of Disputes by
the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1970) (stating that the members of the
Security Council use the law as a tactical weapon to further their own country's
agenda).
175. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
176. See Higgins, supra note 174, at 5-6 (discussing the authority of the Security
Council in terms of majoritarian decision-making).
177. See Acevedo, supra note 122, at 64 (noting that the conflict between regional
organizations such as the OAS and the Security Council result from political differences, rather than from an analysis of the United Nations Charter or regional
charters).
178. See Allen, supra note 65, at 8 (noting the repercussions of political solutions
felt by the civilian population).
179. See Mudge, supra note 57, at 230-31 (describing how the opposing forces in
Biafra used the starvation of thousands of civilians as a political bargaining chip); see
also Sohn, The Security Council's Role in the Settlement of InternationalDisputes, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 402, 403 (1984) (noting that the procedures and political posturing
involved in bringing a dispute before the Security Council force the dismissal of more
controversial issues from the Council's agenda).
180. Review of the United Nations Charter: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the
United Nations Charter of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
837-39 (1954).
181. See id. (describing how the delay in passage of the relief resolution resulted
from the Soviet delegation rejoining the debate and attempting to block any resolutions
that would give the United Nations forces an advantage in the conflict).
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting that the Security Council passed unanimous resolutions on the Korean conflict only because the Soviet Union
had walked out of the meetings).
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resolutions, as it once may have been. 18' Currently, the Security Coun-

cil members, working in consensus as they have done in the embargo
resolutions, would try to prevent the tragedies that occurred after the
Korean blockade.' 85 No guarantee exists that another alliance among
the veto powers will have such an effect in the future. 186 Although the
superpowers were able to create an immediate alliance against Iraq,
new situations could alter this alliance. 187 Countries such as China,
France, and the United Kingdom could disagree and choose to block

any resolution supporting relief efforts. 88 If decisions about the treatment of civilians are based on the political alignment of the Security
Council, civilians will become political pawns in the conflict, 80 rather
than innocent bystanders-a situation that the nations of the world
sought to prevent by creating the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
80
Additional Protocols.
CONCLUSION

When the Security Council created a committee to monitor conditions in Iraq and Kuwait, it chose to implement relief efforts through

negotiation, consensus and political expediency, rather than through
the binding principles of the Geneva Conventions. While such negotia-

tions may, in the future, result in the effective relief efforts required by
184. See, supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text (noting the agreement of the
Sosviet Union- and, the United States on alL nine resolutions, as only Cuba and Yemen
chose to either vote' against resolutions or abstaia from voting entirely).
185. See Goshko, Food Concerns Test Resolve on Sanctions, Wash. Post, Sept. 8,
1990, at A13, A14 (quoting a United States official who stated that the Security Council has no intention of starving the Iraqi people).
186. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 289 (Judgment of June 27) (Schwebel, J. dissenting)
(noting that in one setting the United States adhered to the Security Council's definition of aggression, while, in other circumstances, the United States chose to veto the
same Security Council definition).
187. See Baker, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that the harmony which exists between the superpowers on the Iraqi resolutions could easily disappear if, for example,
the Security Council addressed the conflicts in Pakistan or Lebanon).
188. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1990, at A3, A14 (noting that the Security
Council sanctions committee could not agree on how to determine when food shipments
would be allowed into Iraq and Kuwait); Baker, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that while
the Security Council acted effectively in confronting the Iraqi invasion, the Security
Council did nothing to resolve the Liberian conflict, in which over 5,000 people were
killed, or the conflict in Sri Lanka, in which over 14,000 people were killed).
189. See supra note 57 (discussing how the starvation of the civilian population in
Biafra resulted from the political manipulation of relief efforts).
190. See Allen, supra note 65, at 22-23 (noting that the Geneva Conventions led to
the implementation of stricter distinctions between the civilian and military population); see also Solf, supra note 50, at 130 (discussing how Protocol I creates customary
international law by furthering the principles of civilian immunity and distinction).
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the Geneva Conventions, the Security Council's actions determined
that the Geneva Conventions could be superseded in favor of the determinations of a political body.
From a legal perspective, the choice to supersede customary international law contradicts the history of article 103 interpretation and the
recognition of the separate existence of customary international law in
the Nicaraguacase. From a historical perspective, the Korean conflict
demonstrated that this reliance upon the political negotiations of the
Security Council to implement relief efforts could have adverse consequences. As the Security Council enters a new era of international support and cooperation, it must not lose sight of binding customary humanitarian principles, such as the Geneva Conventions, which protect
civilians, not only from military actions, but also from the changing
political alignment of the United Nations Security Council.

